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INCOME SHIFTING -

RECENT TRENDS

IN LEASEBACK TRANSACTIONS
by
Lawrence B. Gibbs*

T

HE use of intra-family transfers of income-producing properties

to reduce the family tax burden has had a long and colorful history in the tax law. Early developments, involving family trusts and
partnerships, resulted in court-imposed limitations upon the shifting
of income within the family group where the transferor-parent, although purporting to relinquish property intrests, actually retained
dominion and control over the property.1 There followed a series of
Congressional attempts to provide statutory rules for taxing the income produced by the transferred properties among family members
participating in such transactions Recently, various other family
income-shifting arrangementsa-the tax effects of which are not
defined by statute--have prompted the Commissioner and the courts
to resurrect and extend the rationale and arguments of the early court
decisions in this area.
Of special interest to tax practitioners has been the development in
the gift and leaseback area of the dialectic between the Commissioner
and the taxpayer which involves the application of the principles and
policies underlying the Helvering v. Clifford4 decision to an intrafamily transfer of property which is immediately leased back to the
transferor. The taxpayer's thesis that for income tax purposes the
transfer and subsequent leaseback should be viewed as separate transactions and the Commissioner's antithesis that the two steps should be
fused have provided abundant and interesting litigation. The recent
decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Van Zandt v.
Commissioner' represents an important synthesis in this area.
Yale; LL.B., University of Texas; Attorney at Law, Corpus Christi, Texas.
See Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Commissioner v. Tower, 327
U.S. 280 (1946); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940).
2
See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 671-78, 704(e).
a Thus, in a private annuity transaction, where the annuity payments are to be paid solely
out of the property transferred, the Commissioner has succeeded in taxing the income to the
transferor-annuitant on the theory of retained dominion and control. See Samuel v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1962).
Similarly, it is understood the Service has taken the position that the grantor of a shortterm trust remains taxable on the income from oil interests which are transferred to the
trust. Wilson, The Use of Mineral Interests in Short-Term Trusts-A New Tax Problem,
14 Sw. L.J. 495 (1960).
4309 U.S. 331 (1940).
'Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (sth Cir. 1965).
*B.A.,
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I. INTRODUCTION
The gift and leaseback arrangement has become increasingly popular in the last ten years. The intended tax consequences of the arrangement are to substitute a rental deduction for the depreciation deduction' of the donor-lessee and to deflect income in the amount of the
rental payments from the high income tax bracket of the parents to
the lower brackets of the trust and the children. The net economic
result is a tax-saving shift of income within the family. Although
structural changes in the Internal Revenue Code have eliminated
much of the need for' (and in some cases the desirability of') shifting
income and property within the family by inter-vivos gift, the graduated income tax rates and a generally favorable attitude by the
courts9 have prompted the continued use of the gift and leaseback
arrangement. 1°
A related transaction, the sale and leaseback, also is used for family
tax-planning purposes, but because of the tax problems attendant to
the sale of property," especially between related parties,"2 this arrangement has been used sparingly to reallocate income within the family
OTax savings of the donor-lessee are enhanced if the property transferred is nondepreciable (e.g., land) because a deduction is created rather than substituted or, if because of long
use or accelerated depreciation, the property, though depreciable, has a low basis and high
market value. However, the net tax benefit to the family will depend upon the comparative
tax brackets of the parents, the trust and the children. If depreciable property is transferred
in trust, the depreciation deduction is shifted to the trust and its beneficiaries. If the trust
instrument is worded correctly, the depreciation deduction can be allocated between the
trust and the beneficiaries in a manner that will provide the maximum tax benefits. See
Upton v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 911 (1961);
Estate of Little, 274 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1960); Treas. Reg. § 1.652(b)-2 (1956); Rev.
Rul. 47, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 250; Rice, Family Tax Planning ch. 8, § 22 (Supp. 1964).
' See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6013 (joint returns), 2056 (estate tax marital deduction).
sFor a discussion of the possible adverse tax consequences of making lifetime interspousal
gifts, see Casner, Estate Planning 783-84 (3d ed. 1961).
'The following cases have upheld a trusteed intra-family gift and leaseback transaction:
Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp
v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956), acq.
1957-2 Cum. Bull. 6. But see, Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962),
discussed in text accompanying notes 92-93 infra.
Cases which have denied the intended tax effects of a nontrusteed intra-family gift and
leaseback are as follows: Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 834 (1955); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 928 (1952).
is See generally, Smith, Shifting Income Within the Family Group, 30 Taxes 995 (1952).
" If the property is depreciable, a portion of the gain may be ordinary income. See Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1245, 1250; Proposed Treas. Reg. 5 1.1245-1 (a) (3), 29 Fed. Reg.
11366 (1964), which specifically states that a "sale-leaseback transaction" is a disposition to
which § 1245 applies. If an investment credit has been taken and if the property is sold
prior to termination of its useful life, a portion of the credit may be subject to recapture.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 47.
1 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 267 (disallowance of losses, expenses, and interest in
transactions between related taxpayers), 1239 (ordinary income treatment of gain on sale
of depreciable property between spouses or between an individual and his controlled corporation). See also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 482, 707(b), 1551.
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group."3 Instead, the sale and leaseback has been used in family situations involving closely held corporations in order to provide additional deductions to the corporation, 4 to eliminate excess profits" and
to bail out corporate earnings at capital gains rather than ordinary

income rates."9

Other possible uses of the leaseback device to minimize family taxes
include the transfer of property to a tax-exempt foundation with a
leaseback or leaseover, 7 or the transfer and leaseback of property between a closely held family corporation and its employee retirement
fund."8
An investigation of the cases dealing with the various uses of the
transfer and leaseback device reveals an area of ad hoc decisions,
esoteric distinctions, and a host of tax aphorisms. This is due, in
part, to the general sensitivity of the tax law to transactions involving
reallocation of income within the family group."' Such an atmosphere
makes rationalization of past decisions difficult and prediction of
future results precarious. Recent decisions in this area and in related
areas emphasize the importance in planning the transaction and of
carefully arranging the component parts to minimize the potential
tax exposures incident to it."
1For cases involving sale and leaseback between family members, see, e.g., White v.
Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952); Unger v.
Campbell, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9163, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 547 (N.D. Tex.
1960); Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954). Traditionally, the sale and leaseback has been
used as a financing device. See generally Casey, Tax Shelter in Real Estate 42 (2d ed. 1961).
14See generally, Lassers, Does a Lease-Back Save You Money?, 32 Taxes 279 (1954);
Mandell, Tax Aspects of Sales and Leasebacks as Practical Devices for Transfer and Operation
of Real Property, N.Y.U. 18th Inst. on Fed. Tax 17, 21 (1960). As in the gift-leaseback
situation, rental deductions can be substituted for depreciatitn of low-basis property. See
note 6 supra. In addition, if the sale is to a shareholder, corporate earnings can be distributed in the form of rent, which is deductible by the corporation, rather than by a nondeductible dividend.
"See W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 1951).
'6 See discussion of sale and leaseover or leaseback cases at text accompanying notes 13 5-49
infra.
"VE.g., Boman v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1957) (leaseback); Huron
Clinic Foundation v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 847 (D.S.D. 1962), vacated and remanded,
324 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1963) (leaseback); Royal Farms Dairy Co., 40 T.C. 172 (1963)
(leaseover); Anderson Dairy, Inc., 39 T.C. 1027 (1963)
(leaseover); Burroughs Corp.,
33 T.C. 389 (1959) (leaseback); Estate of Goldenberg, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 810 (1964)
(leaseover). See generally Young, Donor Foundation Dealings, N.Y.U. 22d Inst. on Fed.
Tax 956, 993 (1964). See text accompanying notes 116-49 infra.
"s Colorado Nat'l Bank, 30 T.C. 933 (1958); cf. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Employees'
Retirement Fund v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1962); Rev. Rul. 206, 1960-1
Cum. Bull. 201.
The gift and leaseback approach has been used in some cases as a secondary argument for
-upholding a shift of income within a family group which failed to meet the standards of
the family partnership rules. See Stanback v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1959);
Wofford v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1953).
"9See cases cited note 1 supra.
as Several articles have suggested planning and drafting techniques in arranging a gift
and leaseback transaction. See Cohen, Transfers and Leasebacks to Trusts: Tax and Planning
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GIFT AND LEASEBACK

This Article will be concerned primarily with the gift and leaseback arrangement; however, because of its similarity in form and its
importance in recent developments, the sale and leaseback also will
be considered where relevant.2'

A. The Transaction And The Issue
The gift and leaseback arrangement has taken one of two forms.
Either an outright gift is made to a family member with a leaseback
to the donor, 2 or, as is usually the case, the donor establishes an
irrevocable trust (the beneficiaries of which are the members of the
donor's family), conveys property to it, and leases the property
back." The trustee is ordinarily a third party.' The donor may or
may not retain a reversionary interest in the property given to the
trust."2
If a trust is used and if the requirements of sections 671-782' are
met, the donor-lessee is apparently not taxable on the income earned
Considerations, 43 Va. L. Rev. 31 (19 57); Webster, Transfers to Trusts with LeasebacksDrafting and Other Suggestions for Trusts and Lease Agreements, So. Cal. 8th Tax Inst.
319 (1956).
25 Articles discussing the sale-leaseback transaction include Agar, Sales and Lease-backs,
18 Bull. of ABA Tax Section, No. 2, at 61 (January, 1965); Clark, Changing Considerations in Sales and Leaseback Transactions, 42 Taxes 725 (1964); Friedman, Lease or Purchase
of Equipment: Sale and Leaseback, N.Y.U. 14th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1427 (1956); Greenfield,
Corporate Benefits in Using the Sale-Leaseback Device, 37 Taxes 1017 (1959); Lassers, supra
note 14; Mandell, supra note 14; Wilson, Sales and Leasebacks, So. Cal. 16th Tax Inst. 149
(1964). Other articles containing a discussion of both gift and sale and leasebacks are Rice,
op. cit. supra note 6; Cary, Current Problems in Sale, or Gift, and Lease-back Transactions
29 Taxes 662 (1951); Cohen, supra note 20; Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit
and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 Tax L. Rev. 295, 335 (1962); Webster,
supra note 20; Yohlin, Assignment and Deflection of Income, N.Y.U. 20th Inst. on Fed.
Tax 147, 174 (1962).
"See Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834
(1955); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928
(1952); Rev. Rul. 9, 1954-1 Cur. Bull. 20.
"aHall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962); John T. Potter, 27 T.C.
200 (1956); Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954); Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949),
rev'd, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); A. A. Skemp, 8 T.C.
415 (1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
24The trustee may be a corporate trustee, Albert T. Felix, snpra note 23; A. A. Skemp,
supra note 23; or the donor's attorney, Helen C. Brown, supra note 23;' or the father, the
wife, or the accountant of the donor, John T. Potter, supra note 23. The Van Zandt case is
the first in which the donor is also the trustee.
2s Compare the cases cited note 24 supra with Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584
(N.D.N.Y. 1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 92-93 infra, and L L. Van Zandt,
40 T.C. 824 (1963), affd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965).
"GSee Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 671-78.
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by the property held in trust." The regulations s and the committee
reports" state, however, that these sections have no application in
determining the grantor's right to deduct rental payments made to
the trust under a leaseback arrangement. The Commissioner, in
attacking the gift-leaseback, has usually disallowed the rental deduction to the donor-lessee."
The Commissioner's position is that the gift and leaseback is a sham
transaction without business purpose, and that it should be viewed
as a series of prearranged, integrated steps whereby the donor reallocates income within the family by purporting to relinquish property which in reality he retains and controls.' Under this view, for
income tax purposes the donor-lessee is denied a rental deduction;
however, he is entitled to a depreciation deduction because he remains
the owner of the property." For gift tax purposes, the rental obligation under the lease constitutes a gift of a present right to receive the
rentals which has a gift tax value equal to the discounted worth of
the net rental to be received over the period of the trust."
27See

Treas. Reg.

S 1.671-1(c)

(1956).

But see, Dwan, Income Tax Problems in

the Administration of Estates, Simple, and Complex Trusts, University of Texas School of
Law 4th Tax Conf. 25, 35 (1956), suggesting that even if the requirements of § 671-78
are met, the income may be taxed to the grantor on other grounds, such as assignment of
future income. In this respect, it has been suggested that the gift and leaseback arrangement
results in assignment of income. See White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398, 402 (2d Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952), discussed in text accompanying notes 61-64 infra; Helen
C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949), rev'd, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
814 (1950). Although the Commissioner has argued the "assignment of income" theory as
an alternative to disallowance of the rental deduction, he never has attempted to disallow
the rental deduction and, in addition, to tax the income of the trust to the grantor. Even
in cases in which the trust in the gift and leaseback arrangement otherwise would result in
a taxation of trust income to the grantor under the provisions of 5§ 671-78, it is not clear
that the Commissioner would attempt to tax such income to the grantor in addition to
disallowing him the rental deduction. See Cohen, supra note 20 at 42. See also Hall v.
United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), discussed in text accompanying notes
92-93 infra. Under the provisions of each trust in the Hall case, the trust was to terminate
at the death of either the income beneficiary or one of the grantor-spouses, at which time
the property was to revert to the surviving grantor-spouse. In the appellant's brief in the
Van Zandt case, it is suggested that the trust in the Hall case failed to meet the duration
requirements on the basis of these facts. Brief for Appellant, pp. 16-17, Van Zandt v.
Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965). This would seem to be true only if it is also
true that the life expectancy of one of the grantor-spouses in the Hall case was less than
ten years. See Treas. Reg. § 1.673(a)-1(c) (1956).
2
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.671(c) (1956).
Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1954). For an excellent discussion, which
suggests that the attitude of Congress is ambiguous on this point, see Webster, supra note
20, at 320 n.7. See also Cohen, supra note 20, at 40-41.
so See the cases cited in note 23 supra.
31 Rev. Rul. 9, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 20.
a2E.g., W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 1951); I. L.
Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824 (1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965); A. A. Skemp, 8
T.C. 415, 419 (1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
33Rev. Rul. 315, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 624, which modifies Rev. Rul. 9, 1954-1 Cum.
Bull. 20, in which the Commissioner originally indicated that the rental payments would be
treated as gifts in the year of payment. The reason for this modification appears to be to
avoid the loss of gift tax through annual $3,000 exclusions which otherwise might result if
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In early cases, the Commissioner emphasized the donor's retention
and control of the leased property and attacked the rental deduction
either on an "incomplete gift"' theory or under the Clifford doctrine.as Without changing the basis of his argument, the Commissioner recently, and with more success, has changed the form of
his argument to an analysis of the code provisions under section
162 (a) (3), which deals with the rental deduction."6
B. The Statute: "Ordinary and Necessary" Expense

Section 162 (a) (3) states that:
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business, including(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of
property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in
which he has no equity."
the rental payments were treated as annual gifts. If, however, the rentals are based on a
percentage of the profits and if the actual annual rentals are in excess of the projected rentals
upon which the taxpayer initially pays the gift tax, the Commissioner may attempt to tax
the payments as annual gifts. See Talge v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
In Revenue Ruling 315, supra, the duration of the trust (ten years) was coextensive with
the term of the lease. If, however, the grantor retains no reversionary interest so that the
term of the trust is longer than that of the lease, it would appear that for gift tax purposes
the period over which the rentals should be computed would have to be adjusted accordingly. Although the gift tax computation in such an event is not without its difficulties, it
is believed that the maximum period over which the rentals are to be discounted should not
exceed the useful life of the property transferred.
It has been suggested that even if the rentals are treated as gifts, the amounts received
as rent by the trust may be taxable as income to the trust or its beneficiaries. See Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, §§ 102, 641(b), and the discussion by Cohen, supra note 20 at 42-43.
'Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949), rev'd, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 814 (1950); A. A. Skemp, 8 T.C. 415 (1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.
1948). This argument apparently originated in Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710 (2d
Cir. 1936), in which the taxpayer attempted to convert the character of nondeductible
insurance policy premiums to deductible interest items. The husband made a gift of the
proceeds of a bank loan to his wife, who placed the money in a trust which was to pay
premiums on an insurance policy on the husband's life. The husband borrowed the money
back from the trust on a long-term installment obligation with 6% interest in order to
repay the bank. The husband made annual interest payments to the trust, which he deducted, and the trust used the payments to pay the premiums on the life insurance policy.
The court viewed the arrangement as one transaction, and disallowed deduction of the interest on the loan back to the husband on the theory that there was no valid loan since
there had been no valid gift of the money initially.
asE.g., White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928
(1952), discussed in text accompanying notes 61-64 infra; John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200
(1956).
'E.g.,
Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), discussed in text
accompanying notes 92-93 infra; I. L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824 (1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 440
(5th Cir. 1965). It is interesting to note that the Government's appellate brief in the Van
Zandt case is devoted entirely to an analysis of § 162. Brief for Appellee, pp. 9-19, Van
Zandt v. Commissioner, supra.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a) (3).
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The Commissioner has asserted two distinct but related arguments
under this section. First, the section requires a business purpose,
which, in his view, is lacking in the gift-leaseback situation."8 Second,
to be deductible under this section, rental payments must be "ordinary and necessary" and "required to be made as a condition to continued use or possession . . . " whereas, under the Commissioner's
theory, the payments by the donor-lessee are gifts made for personal
35
reasons.
In support of his first argument, the Commissioner cites a number
of cases in the sale and leaseback area in which the courts have disallowed the rental deduction because no business purpose could be
shown for the sale and leaseback transaction.' In addition, the Commissioner argues that, aside from tax consequences, the net effect of
a gift and leaseback is merely to create an economic detriment to the
donor-lessee because after the transaction he must pay rent for using
property which, prior to the transaction, required no payment for
its use and enjoyment."
Similarly, the Commissioner argues that the rental payments are
neither "necessary" nor "required" within the meaning of the statute
because the donor has unrestricted use of the property prior to its
conveyance and because the donor voluntarily creates the situation
which requires the payment of rent."
Prior to the Van Zandt case, the courts usually had ignored the
business purpose argument in the gift and leaseback area, despite their
adherence to it in the sale-leaseback area." The reason for this differas The taxpayer usually has asserted three reasons for using the gift-leaseback arrangement: (1) to reduce income taxes, (2) to provide economic security for the children and
(3) to protect the property from the claims of creditors. See, e.g., Egbert J. Miles, Jr., 41
T.C. 165 (1963), discussed in note 149 infra; Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949),
rev'd, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950). Occasionally, however,
there are additional business reasons, the most common of which is the desire to maintain
liquidity. See Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 1949); Talge
v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Mo. 1964); Southern Ford Tractor Corp., 29
T.C. 833 (1958).
39E.g., Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 38; Ernest V. Berry, 23 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1077 (1964).
'E.g., Finley v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1958); W. H. Armston Co.
v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951); Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174
F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949); Shaffer Terminals, Inc., 16 T.C. 356 (1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d
539 (9th Cir. 1952).
"'Brief for Appellee, p. 15, Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965).
"'See cases cited note 39 supra.
'In the cases which have denied the rental deduction, the lack of business purpose has
been emphasized. Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 834 (1955); 58th Street Plaza Theater, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 724, 725 (2d
Cir. 1952); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398, 400 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 928 (1952); W. H. Armston Co., 188 F.2d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 1951). In the cases
in which the rental deduction has been upheld, the courts either have failed to discuss the
business purpose of the transaction, compare Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d
Cir. 1950), with Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095, 1101 (1949), revd, 180 F.2d 926 (3d
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ence in treatment appears to be that the cases dealing with saleleasebacks normally involve transactions between a corporation and
its shareholders, where business purpose traditionally has been an
important factor in the determination of the tax consequences." If
the gift is to and the leaseback from an independent trustee, the
courts have viewed the gift and leaseback transaction as a series of
separate, substantial and bona fide steps and have rejected the "step

transaction," "form sham" premise of the Commissioner."
In the two earliest cases ' in this area, the taxpayers (a physician
in one and a husband-and-wife mining partnership in the other) conveyed realty used in their business to a third-party trustee who, in
accordance with a prior understanding, immediately leased the property back to the grantors. In both cases the Commissioner argued and
the Tax Court decided that the rental payments were not "required"
because the taxpayers had voluntarily relinquished ownership of the
property in a prearranged plan under which they would continue to
enjoy its use. In each case, however, the court of appeals found that
the taxpayers had irrevocably divested themselves of control over
the property. The court in Skemp v. Commissioner, in language

which has often been quoted in later decisions to justify the rental
deduction, stated:
The Commissioner argues that the payments as rent were not required
because the taxpayer had voluntarily entered into the transaction. While
the taxpayer voluntarily created the situation which required the pay-

ments of rent, the fact remains that the situation created did require the
payments. In this case we have a valid, irrevocable trust, wholly divest-

ing the taxpayer of any interest in the trust property, and an agreement
by the taxpayer to pay the trustee a reasonable rental under a valid lease.
The income from the property is not claimed in this proceeding to be
that of the taxpayer. We have here only a question of deduction of rental
from gross income. There can be no question but what rent required to
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950), or have treated the absence of business purpose
as unimportant. Compare Stearns Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 849, 852
(7th Cir. 1954), with Stearns Magnetic Mfg. Co., 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 535, 537 (1952).
Several cases have acknowledged the Commissioner's argument concerning lack of business
purpose, but have failed to discuss the issue. Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584
(N.D.N.Y. 1962); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956). For further discussion, see Webster, sspra note 20 at 336-37 nn. 44-46.
"See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). It has been held that reduction of taxes by arranging a
transaction to provide capital gain rather than ordinary income treatment is a sufficient
business purpose. Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
However, in that case, the court specifically stated: "On the other hand, where the issue is
the recognition . . . of a sale and leaseback arrangement . . . the existence of an independent business purpose may be very important." Id. at 174-75.
45 See text accompanying note 47 infra.
"Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949), rev'd, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 814 (1950); A. A. Skemp, 8 T.C. 415 (1947), rev'd, 168 F. 2d 598 (7th Cir.
1948).
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be paid is properly deductible. The trustee was duty bound to exact rent
of the taxpayer and the taxpayer was legally bound to pay it, just as
much as if the taxpayer had moved across the street into the property
of a third party."
A recent Tax Court decision indicates a possible change in the
form (but not the substance) of the Commissioner's argument. The
case, Ernest V. Berry," draws upon language contained in the decision
of the Supreme Court in United States v. Gilmore,4 which involved
the deductibility of a husband's legal expenses under section 2 3 (a) (2)
of the 1939 Code." The Supreme Court denied the deduction on the
grounds that the expenditure was personal in nature and, in the course
of its opinion, stated that in order to determine whether payments
are "ordinary and necessary," resort should be had to the origin rather
than to the consequences of the claim with respect to which the
expenses had been incurred. 1
In the Berry" case, the taxpayer, owner of a sole proprietorship
engaged in precision machine grinding, arranged several purchasing
transactions involving expensive machinery so that the machinery was
sold to a girl friend who leased it to the proprietorship at a rental
that enabled her to make purchase price payments and otherwise to
live comfortably." One of the alleged reasons for handling the transaction in this manner was to avoid the property settlelent claims of
the wife of the petitioner who was in the process of obtaining a
divorce. The Tax Court, relying upon Gilmore4 and the trial court
decision in Van Zandt," held that to the extent that the transaction
originated for this reason, the rental payments were personal in nature and hence not deductible.
Adapting the argument to the gift-leaseback situation, apparently
the Commissioner would contend and the Tax Court would hold that
the claim with respect to which the rental expense is incurred is the
47 168 F.2d 598, 599-600 (7th Cir. 1948).
48 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1077 (1964).
49372 U.S. 39 (1963).

"Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a)(2). The 1954 Code re-enacts the provisions of S
23 (a) (2) in § 212. Section 162 of the 1954 Code had as its predecessor § 23 (a) (1) of the
1939 Code. Although the Court in the Gilmore case was concerned with what is now §
212, the Court made it clear that § 162 would be construed as comparable to and in jari
materia with § 212. Gilmore v. United States, supra note 49, at 45.
" 372 U.S. at 49.
"Ernest V. Berry, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1077 (1964).
3 The purpose of a transaction arranged in this manner is similar to that of the transfer
and leaseback, i.e., the substitution of a rental deduction for a depreciation deduction. The
courts have treated it as such. See Consolidated Apparel Co. v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 580
(7th Cir. 1953).
'4 Gilmore v. United States, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
"I. L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824 (1963), aft'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965).
'"Ernest V. Berry, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1077, 1084 (1964).
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rental obligation under the lease, which arises only because of the
voluntary decision of the taxpayer to initiate the gift and leaseback.
Since this decision is prompted by the taxpayer's desire to avoid taxes
by reallocation of income within the family and to provide financial
security for members of his family,' the origin of the lease obligation
which necessitates the rental payment is ultimately personal and,
therefore, is nondeductible under section 262. s
Such an argument, though cogent, is but a variation of the Commissioner's previous position. The conclusion that the rentals originate
in and are necessitated by the taxpayer's personal considerations
stems from an unwillingness to view the transaction as a series of
bona fide, substantial legal relationships. The answer to the argument in the gift-leaseback situation is that the lease obligation on
which the deduction is based originates in a bona fide business transaction in which the trustee, as owner of the property, is required to
exact rent that the taxpayer, as lessee, is required to pay."
C. The Independence of the Trustee
The bona fides of the gift and of the lease have not been sufficient
in themselves to make payments thereunder deductible. The courts
in the past have predicated their willingness to fragmentize the steps
of the gift and leaseback arrangement upon the interposition of an
"independent" third party between the taxpayer as donor and as
lessee."
In the leading Second Circuit decision of White v. Fitzpatrick,"'
the taxpayer transferred patents and real property used in his business to his wife who immediately licensed the patents and leased the
property back to him at reasonable rentals. A majority of the court
denied the rental deduction and held that the reasonableness of the
rental payment was irrelevant because the donor-lessee retained doSee note 38 supyra.
s Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 262. This section precludes deductibility of "personal, liv-

5

ing, or family expenses."
59See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
RUIn both sale-leasebacks and gift-leasebacks, the courts have denied the rental deduction
where the transaction took the form of an outright gift between family members, Finley v.
Commissioner, 255 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1958); Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952); Unger v. Campbell, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5
9163, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 547 (N.D. Tex. 1960); Raymond Cassidy, 10 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 573 (1951), or a distribution by a closely held corporation to its shareholders and a
subsequent reincorporation, Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.
1949), or a sale by a family corporation to its shareholders and leaseback. W. H. Armston
Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951); Shaffer Terminals, Inc., 16 T.C. 356
(1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952), or a sale to a related corporation
and leaseback, Logan Lumber Co., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 735 (1964); Riverpoint Lace
Works, Inc., 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 463 (1954).
6' 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952).
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minion and control over the property. The Skemp 3 and Helen C.
5 decisions were distinguished
Brown"
on the basis of the independence
of the trustee in those cases. The court relied upon the Clifford"4 case
(which dealt with the includability of income of a trust in the taxable income of the grantor) and concluded that the same considerations should apply to the deductibility of rental payments made by
the grantor to the trust. Because of the close family relationship between donor and donee and because of the lack of an independent
party, the court concluded that the husband remained the substantial
owner of the property and that the rental payments to his wife
amounted to assignments of income within the family group.
Although courts and writers alike have emphasized the distinction
between leasebacks directly with family members and leasebacks with
third parties, other cases in related areas have not made this distinction."5 In the case of Elsie SoRelle," for example, the taxpayer, a
farmer, made gifts to his children, shortly before harvest time, of
undivided interests in land on which there was a growing crop. In
accordance with a prior oral understanding, the taxpayer harvested
the crop, stored it, sold it, and borrowed the proceeds of the sale from
the children in return for an unsecured promissory note.
The Commissioner, relying on the Clifford doctrine, attempted to
tax the income from the sale of the crop to the taxpayer; however,
the court found that the father had not "retained such control over
the wheat as to be regarded as its owner for purposes of income taxation.""7 In addition, the court held that there had been no assignment
of income because there had been a complete and bona fide gift of
the income-producing property prior to the realization of income.'
Similarly, in the case of A. N. McQuown,o0 the taxpayer, a Texas
resident, made gifts of undivided interests in road construction equipment to his children, one of whom was a minor. Acting under
authorization by the children, the taxpayer leased the equipment to
himself and to others. Rentals were collected and divided equally
62A. A. Skemp, 8 T.C. 415 (1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948), discussed in
text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
63 Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949), rev'd, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 814 (1950), discussed in text accompanying note 46 supra.
' Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
65 See, e.g., Alexander v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1951); Visintainer v.
Commissioner, 187 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 858 (1951); John H.
Denmark, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 487 (1955).
"22 T.C. 459, 475 (1954).
67 Id. at 477.
6' For an excellent discussion of whether the gift and leaseback constitutes an assignment
of income, see Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the
P.G. Lake Case, 17 Tax L. Rev. 295, 335 (1962).
69 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 654 (1953).
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among family members. The Commissioner attempted to tax all of
the income to the husband and wife as community income. The Tax
Court found that the gifts of the equipment had been complete
despite the father's retention of control because in exercising his control, the father had acted as an agent of the children, who retained the
right of control and who had consented to its exercise by their father. °
The SoRelle and McQuown cases stand for the proposition that in
allocating income where there has been a direct intra-family gift of
property, the mere fact that the donor retains control and use of the
property does not make him the substantial owner of the property
for purposes of taxing to him income produced by the sale or use of
the property. No logical reason appears for making a distinction in
the case of the donor-lessee of an intra-family gift and leaseback by
treating him as the substantial owner of property for purposes of
denying him a rental deduction.'
This result has received Congressional approval in a related area,
the family partnership. Generally speaking, so long as income is produced by property rather than by services, the income may be shifted
within the family by transferring ownership of the property through
bona fide sales or gifts of family partnership interests."' If the transfer
is complete, the donor-parent may continue to exercise effective management powers over the partnership affairs.7" Furthermore, under
appropriate circumstances trusts for minor children may be recognized as family partners for income tax purposes even though the
donor-parent is the trustee.'
In any event, it is doubtful that the distinction between direct
leasebacks with members of the family and leasebacks from independent third parties is sound, because the third parties are rarely "independent.,7 Moreover, it is often true that intra-family relationships
will require more businesslike transactions than would be required if
the trustee were the donor's bank or personal advisor.0 Furthermore,
70

1d. at 657.
"' See Judge Chase's dissent in White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952), in which it is stated: "The fact that in the Skemp and
Brown cases the transfers were to independent trustees for the benefit of family members
is a distinction without a difference since that bore only on the completeness of the gifts
and reasonableness of the royalties and rentals paid, both here shown and found."
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 704(e).
"3Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (ii)(d) (1956).
'4Treas. Reg. § 1.704-I (e) (2) (vii) (1956).

"5See Note, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 247 (1951); Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1250 (1952).
" In Joseph N. Ned Co., for example, the court stated:
While the actions of a family corporation or family group should be carefully
scrutinized, it is entirely conceivable that the relations each with the other,
or their respective personalities, may be such that they will deal with each
other strictly at arm's length. In fact, it sometimes happens that the very
nearness in blood leads them to be more independent in action than strangers
in blood. 22 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1954).
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if all of the family members are adults," a trustee ordinarily will not
be necessary.
If independence of the trustee is made the test of the deductibility
of rental payments on the leaseback, and if the donor's accountant or
lawyer will qualify as an "independent trustee,"" one might speculate
as to whether a gift by the husband of his separate property to his
wife, as trustee for their children, with leaseback to the husband
would be sufficient for purposes of allowing him the rental deduction.' Reduced to these terms, the "independence" of the trustee
becomes a mere formal test.
D. Reasonable Rent
One requirement of a valid gift-leaseback transaction on which
all courts and writers agree is that the lessee must pay a reasonable
rental for the use of the property.0 There is, however, no statutory
requirement that rentals be reasonable in order to be deductible, and an
early Tax Court decision holds that even with an agreement between
related parties, mere proof that the rent is unreasonable is not sufficient if the rent in fact is required as a condition to the continued
use of the property. In the case of Stanley Imerman,8" the petitioners,
members of a family partnership, were children of the lessor. The
lease provided for an annual rental, based on a percentage of the
profits, which exceeded rents paid by neighboring businesses. The
court held that proof that the rentals were excessive did not by itself
preclude the deductibility of the rentals in the absence of a further
showing that any part of the payments was intended as a gift. "
" A direct gift and leascback within a family group which includes a minor may cause
administrative problems in the management of the property as well as certain tax problems
incident to a direct gift to a minor. See Branscomb, Tax Aspects of Gifts to Minors, University of Texas School of Law 6th Tax Conf. 70 (1958).
78 See note 24 supra.
7' Consider, however, the effect of designating the grantor's wife as trustee for purposes
of taxing the rental income earned by the property held in trust. See Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 674. Query, whether partition of the community property under Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art. 4624(a) (1960), followed by the husband's gift in trust for the benefit
of his children with his wife as trustee, would be sufficient for purposes of allowing the
husband a rental deduction upon his leaseback of the property. In this respect, see Rice,
Family Tax Planning ch. 8, 5 23, at 202 (1960).
"oCourts have denied the rental deduction where the rent was excessive, Kirschenmann
v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955), and have emphasized the reasonableness of the rentals where the deduction has been upheld, e.g., John T.
Potter, 27 T.C. 200, 213 (1956); Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794, 804 (1954).
817 T.C. 1030 (1946).
a Prior to the Imerman case, the Supreme Court, in construing the phrase "ordinary
and necessary," had held that the fact that payment of an expense had been made under
a legally enforceable obligation did not in itself make the expense deductible. Deputy v.
Dupont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940). See also Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 130
F.2d 136, 139 (8th Cir. 1942). Emphasizing these authorities, the dissent in the Imerman
case stated:
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Subsequent decisions involving transactions between unrelated
parties have held that if the rent is excessive and if the facts indicate
that a portion of the payment is intended as a dividend or gift, the
excess will be disallowed; however, the remainder of the payment
will be deductible." But if the rent is excessive in intra-family transfer-leasebacks, the tendency seems to be to disallow the entire deduction." Thus, although section 162 (a) (3) and early decisions
involving related parties do not require that rent be reasonable in
order to be deductible, the courts in the gift-leaseback cases have
added this requirement by presuming that the payments are intended
as gifts rather than as rent if the amount of the payments is in
excess of a fair rental value."s
E. Retained Equities
Prior to several recent cases, writers had speculated as to the suc[T]he test of reasonableness aids in determining whether an expense is ordinary, or necessary, or both. . . . The relationship of the parties to the transaction which gives rise to the payment for which a taxpayer seeks deduction
must be examined to determine whether the relationships and circumstances
are such that the terms agreed to result in expenses which are both necessary
and ordinary in the operation of the particular business. If a contract is an
arm's length business agreement, payments made pursuant thereto probably
constitute a deductible business expense; if not, the mere fact that the payment for which the deduction is sought is made under a contract is not
ground for allowing the deduction. . . . In the instance of rent, even though
parties enter into a lease agreement and the payments are made under its
terms, if the circumstances are such that the lessee pays, out of his mere willingness, more than the lessor would require as a condition for the continued
use of the property, then the sum paid over and above the required amount is
not an ordinary and necessary expense, and is not deductible, under section
[162(a)(3)]. . . . 7 T.C. at 1039-40.
It is believed that this statement best summarizes the law as it is today in this area. See,
e.g., Roland P. Place, 17 T.C. 199 (1951), aff'd, 199 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953), acq. 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 3; 58th Street Plaza Theater, Inc.,
16 T.C. 469 (1951), aff'd in part, 195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 820
(1952), acq. 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 3; Stanwick's, Inc., 15 T.C. 556 (1950), aff'd per curiam,
190 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1951); 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 25.110, at 323 (1960).
See also Royal Farms Dairy Co., 40 T.C. 173 (1963); Estate of Goldenberg, 23 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 810 (1964).
"aE.g., Roland P. Place, supra note 82; 58th Street Plaza Theater, Inc., supra note 82;
Stanwick's, Inc., supra note 82; Logan Lumber Co., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 735, 744
(1964).
4
See Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 350 U.S. 834
(1955). Curiously, the trial court in the Kirschenmann case had found that the rental,
payable on a "crop share" basis, was in general conformity with crop-share leases in the
area. Although the actual rental under the crop-share arrangement was greatly in excess
of the fixed yearly rental paid previously by the donor-lessees, there appears to be no discussion of the business risk involved in a crop share lease, as opposed to a lease with a fixed
rental. See Kirschenmann v. Westover, 53-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9126, 44 Am. Fed. Tax R.
1271 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
11If the corporation is the vendor-lessee and the lessor is a shareholder, the disallowed
portion may be taxed to the shareholder as a dividend. See W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951); Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 569
(7th Cir. 1949).
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cess of the short-term grantor trust in the gift-leaseback situation."'
In Revenue Ruling 54-9,"7 the Commissioner made his position clear
that rent would not be deductible under such an arrangement. The
basis of the Commissioner's position was that the reservation of a
reversionary interest in the property was further indication of the
grantor's retention of dominion and control under the Clifford
doctrine."'
Subsequent cases, however, have indicated a statutory ground for
disallowance of the rental deduction if the grantor retains a reversionary interest. Section 162 (a) (3)" precludes a rental deduction if
the taxpayer possesses an equity in the property which he is renting.
This language was originally intended to prevent a mortgagor under
a mortgage-purchase arrangement from deducting as rent what
amounted to purchase payments which otherwise would have been
capitalized and, if the property was depreciable, recouped through
depreciation deductions." The courts, however, have interpreted the
language of the section literally and have disallowed a rental deduction to a grantor-lessee who has retained a reversionary interest in
the property transferred to the trust. 1
In Hall v. United States,"1 three doctors who owned the building
in which their offices were located created irrevocable trusts for the
benefit of their children with a trust company as trustee, conveyed
the building to the trust, and took a leaseback. The terms of the
trusts were for ten years, after which time the property would revert
to the grantors. The court held that the reversionary interests constituted equities which precluded deduction of the rental, even though
the trustee had been given the power to sell the building without the
consent of the grantors.a
86 Compare Webster, Transfers to Trusts with Leasebacks-Drafting and Other Suggestions for Trust and Lease Arrangements, So. Cal. 8th Tax Inst. 319, 348 (1956), with
Committee on Publications, Section of Taxation, Trust and Lease-Back, 40 A.B.A.J. 714,
715 (1954).
8' 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 20.
98 Id. at 22. Nowhere in the Revenue Ruling does the Commissioner cite statutory
authority for disallowance of the rental deduction. Instead, the Commissioner relies upon
case authority dealing with family partnerships, Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733
(1949); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946), assignment of income, Helvering
v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), and other cases in the family area, Johnson v. Commission.
er, 86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936); Sall v. Smith, 53-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 9123, 45 Am. Fed,
Tax R. 1018 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
"' Quoted in text accompanying note 37 supra.
9°See Mertens, op. cit. supra note 82 § 25.108, at 311; Note, 11 Tax L. Rev. 65, 68
(1955).
91Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y.
1962); 1. L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C.
824 (1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965).
82208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
3Id. at 588. As an alternate ground, the court disallowed the rental deduction because
of the retention by the grantors of the reversionary interests and the reservation by the
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Another case, Burroughs Corp.," involved a contribution of property by the corporation to a private, charitable foundation established
for the benefit of its employees; as a part of the transaction, the
corporation took a twenty-five year leaseback with renewal options
for an additional thirty years. The taxpayer retained the power to
control the administration of the trust and an indirect power to
terminate the trust, which if exercised would give the taxpayer the
right to reacquire the property at a price equal to the tax deduction
allowed on the initial transfer. The court disallowed the charitable
deduction on the grounds that the retention of the administrative
powers and reversionary rights rendered the gift incomplete. 5 In
addition, the court disallowed the rental deduction for the reason
that the retention of broad powers of control by the taxpayer precluded a holding that the taxpayer had no equity in the property. "
Apparently, the fact that the property would revert to the grantor
only upon termination of the foundation, and only then upon payment of a stated price, did not bar a finding that the taxpayer had
retained an equity because these events were wholly controlled by the
taxpayer. This case appears to stand for the proposition that for purposes of determining his right to a rental deduction, a taxpayer will
be deemed to have retained an equity in property donated and leased
back if he reserved a contingent reversionary interest and an indirect
power to control the contingency.
It also has been suggested that if property is conveyed subject to
an encumbrance which gives the transferor an equity of redemption,
such equity will preclude the deduction of rentals under section
162 (a) (3)." In Texas it is common practice for a grantor to retain
an express vendor's lien and to receive back a deed of trust to secure
grantors of the power to control the trustee's actions by providing them with the right to
"settle accounts" with the trustee at any time. Ibid.
933 T.C. 389 (1959).
5
G Id. at 408-09.
H Id, at 410.
"'See the concurring opinion in Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955). In the Kirscsenmnann case, the parents, potato farmers,
purchased land on an installment basis and immediately conveyed the property to their
twelve-year old daughter. The husband's brother was appointed guardian for the daughter
and executed a leaseback to the husband and wife. Judge Fee, in his concurring opinion,
based the denial of the rental deduction on the fact that under California law if the daughter
had defaulted on payment of the mortgage, the parents would have had an equitable right
of redemption, which Judge Fee considered an equity under § 162(a) (3). See also Rice,
op. cit. supra note 79, at 203; Webster, supra note 86, at 340-41.
Some states provide a statutory right of redemption under which a mortgagor is entitled to redeem property within a designated time after the foreclosure sale by tendering
to the purchaser the amount of the purchase price, plus interest and expenses of the sale.
Texas has no such statutory right of redemption. In Texas, the mortgagor and those holding
under him possess an equity of redemption prior to the time of sale by a trustee under a
deed of trust or by judicial foreclosure; however, the equity is cut off by a trustee's sale
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the unpaid balance of the purchase price. Technically, reservation of
a vendor's lien carries with it legal title" until the purchase price is
paid and gives the vendor the equitable right of rescission" if the
purchase price is not paid. It is, perhaps, arguable that if the lien is
retained the vendor also has retained title to, or an equity in, the property so that rent upon the subsequent leaseback is not deductible.'
III.

RELATED USES OF THE GIFT AND LEASEBACK

In addition to the use of gifts directly to or in trust for members
of the family with leasebacks, the gift-leaseback arrangement also

has been used in situations involving employee retirement funds''
as to parties with notice, or by a decree of foreclosure when executed by sale if the parties
holding the title and equity of redemption are before the court. See 2 Lange, Land Titles
and Title Examination § 463, at 317 (1961). For cases in Texas dealing with the equity
of redemption of the mortgagor, see Pierson v. Pierson, 136 Tex. 310, 150 S.W.2d 788
(1941); Willis v. Smith, 66 Tex. 31, 17 S.W. 247 (1886); Thompson v. Litwood Oil &
Supply Co., 287 S.W. 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). It is not clear, however, that the lack
of a statutory right of redemption in Texas will protect the mortgagor who sells and leases
back because he still retains an equitable right to redeem the property in the event of default before foreclosure. In view of the literal interpretation placed on this part of the
statute by the courts in the past, it is suggested that the mortgage should be discharged
prior to the time of sale and leaseback.
"9The vendor's "legal title" is only a security which gives the vendor no beneficial interest in the land, Brown v. Canterbury, 101 Tex. 86, 104 S.W. 105 (1907); Carey v.
Starr, 93 Tex. 508, 56 S.W. 324 (1900); which may be waived, Estes v. Browning, 11
Tex. 237 (1853); Wickwire-Mitchell Royalty Trust v. Taylor, 200 S.W.2d 441 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947); which may be released, Harvey v. Elder, 191 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946) error ref.; Tetens v. Tetens, 45 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error
dism.; or which may be lost as against third parties unless properly perfected in writing and
filed for record in the county where the land is located. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts.
5520, 5522 (1958). See generally 1 Lange, op. cit. supra note 97, at 62-65.
"OE.g., Bradford v. Knowles, 86 Tex. 505, 25 S.W. 1117 (1894); McCamly v. Waterhouse, 80 Tex. 340, 16 S.W. 19 (1891); Stephens v. Mathews Heirs, 69 Tex. 341, 6 S.W.
567 (1887); Roth v. Conner, 25 SW.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). The implied
vendor's lien, on the other hand, does not provide its holder with the equitable right of
rescission. Johnson v. Smith, 115 Tex. 193, 280 S.W. 158 (1926); Rooney v. Porch, 239
S.W. 910 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922); Rhiddlehoover v. Boren, 260 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924). See 1 Lange, op. cit. supra note 97, at 60 n.25.
" If the vendor has expressly reserved a lien, it seems equally arguable that he "has
not taken" and "is not taking" title to the property within the meaning of § 162(a) (3)
of the Code. It might be wise, however, for the vendor who is considering a leaseback to
forego an express vendor's lien and to retain only an implied vendor's lien in order to
avoid exposure to loss of the rental deduction on the ground that he has retained an
"equity" in the form of an equitable right of rescission. See note 97 supra.
"' See, e.g., Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Employees' Retirement Fund v. Commissioner,
306 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1962); Burroughs Corp., 33 T.C. 389 (1959); Colorado Nat'l Bank,
30 T.C. 933 (1958), acq. 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 3. See generally Alexander, Tax Status of
Pension Trusts: Requirements for Maintaining Exemption, N.Y.U. 13th Inst. on Fed. Tax
435, 443 (1955); Chatterton, Contribute Property To Your Employees' Trust? It Has
Great Tax Advantage, 14 J. Taxation 322 (1961); Greenfield, Corporate Benefits in Using
the Sale-Leaseback. Device, 37 Taxes 1017, 1019 (1959); Rothschild, Problems of Employer
Cost and Coverage: Trusteed Plans, N.Y.U. 21st Inst. on Fed. Tax 589, 598 (1963); P-H
Pension & Profit Sharing Serv. 5 7517 (1963).
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and private foundations.' 2 Depending upon the taxpayer's purpose
and financial needs, the transfer may be in the form of a gift,' sale,'
or a bargain sale.' Unlike the gift-leaseback arrangement involving
only members of the family, if a gift is made to a qualified employee
retirement fund or tax-exempt foundation, there is no gift tax
payable'" and an additional income tax deduction is obtained.'"
However, title to the property conveyed must be transferred outside
of the family, and a reversionary interest cannot be retained if full
gift and income tax benefits are to be obtained.' In addition, if
appreciated property is transferred, there may be a taxable gain,"a
'' See, e.g., Boman v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1957); Huron Clinic
Foundation v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 847 (D.S.D. 1962), vacated and remanded, 324
F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1963). See generally Cutler, Various Aspects of Contributions to Charities, N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1117, 1137-40 (1959); Greenfield, op. cit. supra note
101, at 1018; Richardson, Gifts of Property to a Charity, So. Cal. 9th Tax Inst. 705
(1957); Young, Donor Foundation Dealings, N.Y.U. 22d Inst. on Fed. Tax 965, 993-1002
(1964).
10 Boman v. Commissioner, supra note 102; Burroughs Corp., 33 T.C. 389
(1959);
Colorado Nat'l Bank, 30 T.C. 933 (1958).
'o°Huron Clinic Foundation v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 847 (D.S.D. 1962), vacated
and remanded, 324 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1963).
105A bargain sale, which is a sale of property at less than its fair market value, is
discussed in S. M. Freidman, 41 T.C. 428 (1963); Elizabeth H. Potter, 38 T.C. 951
(1962). See also Richardson, supra note 102, at 720; Wilson, Sales and Leasebacks, So. Cal.
16th Tax Inst. 149, 163-69 (1964).
'o In computing an individual's taxable gifts during the year, a deduction is allowed
for gifts to certain tax-exempt organizations. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2522. For
gift tax purposes, a transfer of property by a corporation is deemed to be a gift from
the individual shareholders of the corporation. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1) (1958).
See White v. United States, 59-I U.S. Tax Cas. 5 11862, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1814 (W.D.
Ark. 1959).
07 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 170 (deductibility of donations to tax-exempt foundations), 404 (deductibility of employer contributions to qualified employee plans). If the
contribution is in the form of a gift, a deduction will be allowed in an amount equal to
the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift. Treas. Reg. 5 1.170-1 (c)
(1958); 2 Nossaman, Trust Administration and Taxation § 45.18, at 354 (1964). If a
bargain sale is made, the vendor will be entitled to a deduction to the extent that the
fair market value of the property exceeds the sales price. See Richardson, supra note 102,
at 720; Wilson, supra note 105, at 163-69.
' For income and gift tax purposes, the charitable deduction may be reduced or disallowed entirely if the donor retains an interest in the property. Burroughs Corp., 33 T.C.
389 (1959), discussed in text accompanying notes 94-96 supra; Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 170(f); Treas. Reg. §5 1.170-1(d) and (e) (1958), 25.2522(a)-2(a) and (b) (1953).
Employer deductions for contributions to employee retirement funds established under
§ 401 will be disallowed if there is any possibility that the property may revert to the
employer prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities under the plan. Tress. Reg. 1.401-2(a)
(1956); see Gisholt Machine Co., 4 T.C. 699, 706 (1945); Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc.,
5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1014 (1946); Rev. Rul. 121, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 65, 78-79.
As to whether retention of the right to repurchase the property will preclude deduction,
compare Burroughs Corp., 33 T.C. 389 (1959), and Estate of Alldis, 46 B.T.A. 1171
(1942), aff'd on other grounds, 140 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1944), with Colorado Nat'l Bank,
30 T.C. 933 (1958), acq. 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 3.
"o'If the property is transferred by sale or by bargain sale, there is taxable gain to the
extent that the sales price exceeds the vendor's adjusted basis. If appreciated property is
transferred by gift, however, there is a curious dichotomy in treatment by the Commissioner
and the courts between a gift to charity under 5 170 and a contribution to a qualified
employee retirement plan under S 404. In the former situation, it has been held that
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and if the property is also depreciable, a portion of the gain may
be ordinary income.
If a closely held corporation111 has established a qualified pension or
profit-sharing plan, the corporation may make a deductible contribution by gift or bargain sale of property used in its business, but may
there is no taxable gain to the grantor at the time of the gift. Campbell v. Prothro,
209 F.2d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1954); Humacid Co., 42 T.C. 894 (1964); Stuart A.
Rogers, 33 T.C. 785, 787-88 (1962), non-acq., 1963-2 Cum. Bull. 6, and the cases cited
therein; Rev. Rul. 410, 1955-1 Cum Bull. 297. On the other hand, the Commissioner and
the courts have treated the employer's contribution to a qualified employee retirement plan
as a taxable event in which the employer realizes gain or loss. United States v. General Shoe
Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961). See also Rev. Rul.
186, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 279; I.T. 3357, 1940-1 Cum. Bull. 11. A loss on such a transaction would not be deductible, however. Dillard Paper Co., 42 T.C. 588 (1964); Rev.
Rul. 163, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 58. See also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 267(a) (1), (b) (9),
which disallows losses on sales between a person and a private foundation directly or indirectly controlled by him. In view of the manner in which the General Shoe rationale has
been extended, the present tax treatment of transfers of appreciated property to charity is
not assured. See Davis v. United States, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962); Estate of Wood, 39
T.C. 1, 7 (1962); John D. Riley, 37 T.C. 932, 937 (1962), aff'd per curiam, 328
F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1964); Glassmoyer, Charitable Gifts of Appreciated Property, N.Y.U.
20th Inst. on Fed. Tax 243, 256-57 (1962).
10 If depreciable property is donated to charity, the amount of the deduction is reduced to the extent that it would have been recaptured under §§ 1245 and 1250 if the
property had been sold. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 170(e). This is consistent with the
nonrecognition of gain treatment accorded to charitable transfers of appreciated property.
See note 109 supra. There is no corresponding provision to 5 170(e) under § 404, which
deals with the deductibility of a contribution to a qualified employee retirement fund.
Presumably, therefore, the contribution is fully deductible. It would seem to follow
logically, under the General Shoe rationale, that the portion of the gain realized at the
time of the contribution which is subject to recapture under 5 1245 or § 1250 should be
reported as ordinary income. The wording of §§ 1245 and 1250 appears to be broad
enough to support such treatment. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §5 1245(a)(1)(ii),
1250(a) (1)(i). See generally Shapiro, Recapture of Depreciation and Section 1245 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 72 Yale L.J. 1483, 1488-91 (1963).
If there is a substantial exposure to recapture of depreciation under § 1245 or 5 1250,
or if the property, though nondepreciable, has a low basis, it would appear from the above
analysis that the bargain sale, rather than an outright gift, might be made to a qualified
employee retirement plan. If the sales price is equivalent to the adjusted basis of the
property in the hands of the taxpayer, there may be no gain to which § 1245 or 5 1250
would apply, and the employer would be entitled to a deduction in an amount equal
to the difference between the fair market value and the sales price of the property. See
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-4(a)(3), (4) 29 Fed. Reg. 11366 (1964); cf. S. M. Freidman, 41 T.C. 428 (1963); Elizabeth H. Potter, 38 T.C. 951 (1962). Query, however,
whether the bargain sale would be sufficient to avoid capital gain treatment under the
General Shoe doctrine? Consider also the implications of applying the General Shoe doctrine
in conjunction with 5 170(e) to transfers of appreciated property to charity. See note
109 supra.
...The transfer-leaseback arrangement involving a trusteed pension or profit-sharing
plan also may be used if the taxpayer is a proprietorship or a partnership, under a so-called
"H.R. 10" plan, enacted by the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962,
76 Stat. 809 (codified in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954). See
generally, Grayck, Tax Qualified Retirement Plans for Professional Practitioners: A Comparison of Self-Employed Individuals' Tax Retirement Act of 1962 and the Professional
Association, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 415 (1963). Because of the limitations upon employer
contributions and deductions, the severe penalties for excess contributions under such a
plan, and exposure to loss of the trust's exemption for dealings with owner-employees, a
transfer and leaseback of business property with a trustee under an H.R. 10 plan normally
would be undesirable or not feasible. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 55 401(c)-(e),
404(a)(8), (9) and (e), 503(j)(1).
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retain control of the property by leasing it back at a reasonable rental,
which is also deductible."' Although the code sets limitations upon
the amount of employer contributions that can be deducted annually,"' there is a provision for carryover of the excess contribution to succeeding years until the excess is exhausted." 4 If properly
planned, the gift and leaseback arrangement between the corporation
and the trust of its employee retirement fund will enable the corporation initially to fund the plan for its employees without impairing its liquidity and without loss of control over the property. Fur112 See generally Chatterton, supra note 101, at 333-35. A careful study of accounting
data and review of the tax exposures should be made. See Rev. Rul. 46, 1953-1 Cum.
Bull. 287; Lurie, Qualified Pension and Profit Sharing Retirement Plans for Small ComPanies, N.Y.U. 12th Inst. on Fed. Tax 327, 345 (1954). See notes 109-10 supra.
A substantial initial contribution to satisfy the employer's cost of funding an exempt
pension plan normally will produce no difficulty. Rothschild, supra note 101, at 601. But
see, Rev. Rul. 186, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 279, which indicates that the conveyance is subject
to the documentary stamp tax. On the other hand, contributions to a profit-sharing plan
must be made only out of profits or accumulated earnings of the employer. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401-1(b) (1) (ii) and (iii) (1956); Alexander, Advantages and Disadvantages of Pension,
Profit Sharing and Stock Bonus Plans: A Discussion, N.Y.U. 14th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1251,
1284 n.127 (1956). A closely held corporation may have accumulated earnings and
profits which will allow a contribution equal in amount to the fair market value of the
corporate property which is to be contributed. If there are not sufficient profits, it may
be necessary to make fractional gifts of the property over a period of years. In this respect,
see note 130 infra and accompanying text.
...If a contribution is made to a profit-sharing plan, the employer can deduct up to
15% of the compensation of all of the employees participating in the plan. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 404(a)(3). If the contribution is made to a pension plan, the employer is
given several alternative methods of computing the maximum annual deduction. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 404(a) (1). For a discussion of these alternatives, see Rice, Basic Pension
and Profit-Sharing Plans 25-26 (1961). If pension and profit-sharing plans are combined,
the maximum deduction is 25% of the compensation of the employees who are participating
in the plan. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404(a) (7).
4
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404(a)(1)(D), (a)(3)(A), (a)(7). If there are two
or more qualified employee retirement plans, and there is an excess contribution, the carryover, or "roll-over," contribution is deductible up to 30% of the compensation of the
employees in the plan in any year into which the excess is carried. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 404(a)(7); see Case Study of the Planning and Execution of a Qualified Employee's Retirement Plan, N.Y.U. 21st Inst. on Fed. Tax 625, 639, 658 (1963).
Careful drafting is necessary to insure the carryover of excess contributions. If a
profit-sharing plan contains a predetermined formula for computing the amount of the
employer's annual contribution, a contribution in excess of that amount is not deductible
and cannot be carried over to a subsequent year. Gross-Given Mfg. Co. v. Kelm, 99 F.
Supp. 144 (D. Minn. 1951); Wooster Rubber Co., 14 T.C. 1192 (1950), rev'd on other
grounds, 189 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1951); I.T. 4055, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 30. However, the
formula may be amended, either formally or informally, to allow a larger contribution
in that year. McClintock-Trunkey Co. v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1954);
Rev. Rul. 366, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 366.
A qualified profit-sharing plan no longer is required to contain a predetermined formula
for computing the amount of the employer's annual contribution. See Treas. Reg. S
1.401-1(b) (1)(ii) (1956). If the profit-sharing plan does not have a definite predetermined formula, however, there must be a payment (for cash-basis taxpayers) or a liability
to make the contribution (accrual-basis taxpayers) before the end of the year in which the
deduction is claimed in order to satisfy the provisions of § 461. See Alexander, Advantages
and Disadvantages of Pension, Profit Sharing and Stock Bonus Plans: A Discussion, N.Y.U.
14th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1251, 1284-85 (1956); Case Study of the Planning and Execution
of a Qualified Employee's Retirement Plan, Id. at 659-660.
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thermore, the arrangement will provide the corporation with additional working capital and an annual deduction for its contributions
to the trust"' and will secure rental deductions to the corporation for
its payments under the lease.
Another use of the gift-leaseback arrangement in family tax
planning is suggested by the Burroughs case."' The taxpayer establishes a private foundation, donates business property, and leases the
property back. If the property is unencumbered, the private foundation will not be taxed on the rental income received under the
lease."" If the taxpayer is a sole proprietorship or a partner, his maximum charitable deduction for the year in which the contribution is
made is twenty per cent of his adjusted gross income,"' or, if the
taxpayer is a corporation, five per cent of its taxable income.'9
Although the 1964 Revenue Act"'. provides a limited carryover of
"' Query, however, whether an initial large contribution to a profit-sharing plan which
will provide carryovers for a number of years will be sufficient to satisfy the requirement
that the plan be permanent rather than temporary. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (2)
(1956) with Lincoln Electric Co. Employees' Profit-Sharing Trust v. Commissioner, 190
F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1951); Sherwood, Swan & Co., 42 T.C. 299 (1964); Produce
Reporter Co., 18 T.C. 69 (1952), aff'd, 207 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1953), non-acq. 1952-2
Cum. Bull. 5. For further discussion, see Rice, op. cit. supra note 113, at 54-58.
"'Burroughs Corp., 33 T.C. 389 (1959), discussed in text accompanying notes 94-96
supra.

...
Although a charitable organization is normally not subject to federal income taxes,
it is taxable on its "unrelated business taxable income," which is income derived from the
conduct of a business that is not substantially related to the charitable function of the
organization. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 511-13. Unrelated business taxable income
excludes most forms of passive income, such as rent from real property, unless such rent
is received under a "business lease." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 512, 514. A lease of real
property is a "business lease" if it is for a term of more than five years and if the lessor
organization incurs an indebtedness in order to acquire or improve the property. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, S 514.
Income from the lease of personal property, as such, is not mentioned in the code or
the regulations. In one case, involving a qualified employee retirement fund, it was held
that if the trust purchases certain equipment with trust assets and later leases the equipment to the employer, the rental is unrelated business taxable income. The court held
that the leasing activity, although it involved only one lease of twenty-one pieces of
equipment, was sufficient to constitute a business. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Employees'
Retirement Fund v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1962). See also Rev. Rul. 206,
1960-1 Cum. Bull. 201. It is, perhaps, questionable whether the rationale of the above
decisions and revenue ruling would be applicable if personal property were received by a
charitable foundation as a contribution, because none of the foundation's assets would be
used to purchase the property and there would be less in the nature of business activity.
Nevertheless, the rationale of the Cooper Tire el Rubber Co. case is broad enough to include
such a transaction. See 6 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 34.14A (Supp. 1964).
It is clear, however, that if real property (and personal property attached thereto) is
received by gift, the subsequent rental income on a leaseback will not be unrelated business
taxable income in the absence of an encumbrance upon the property. See Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 512(b)(3), (4), 514(b)-(d).
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170(a), (b) (I) (B), subject to reduction under § 170(e).
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170(a), (b) (2), subject to reduction under § 170(e).
0 Revenue Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 19 (codified in scattered sections of Int. Rev. Code
of 1954).
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excess contributions by individuals,"' this provision does not apply
to contributions to private foundations."' A five-year carryover of
excess contributions by a corporation is apparently allowed without
regard to whether the contribution is made to a private or public
foundation." 3 A recent amendment to the regulations under section
170 requires the submission of additional information by an individual
taxpayer if a noncash contribution is made and a deduction in excess
of $200 is claimed." 4
There is an approach which avoids loss of the contribution in excess
of the amount deductible in the year of the gift and which is discussed in the case of Andrus v. Burnet."' There the grantors established a private foundation to which they conveyed land in return
for a series of installment obligations. In accordance with their
original intention, the grantors cancelled each of the notes as it
became due and took an annual charitable deduction in the amount
of the cancelled payment. The Commissioner disallowed the annual
charitable deduction on the ground that a contribution of the entire
property had been made in the year of the purported sale, which was
actually a sham. The appellate court, however, upheld the transaction and allowed the annual deductions on the theory that each note
was valid and enforceable and could have been negotiated or presented
for payment at maturity, so that no gift was actually made until the
payment was cancelled."
Although the installment sale provides gift tax advantages, it also
raises income tax problems."' Also, if the vendor retains a lien and
deed of trust, he may be deemed to have an "equity" in the prop1mInt.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 170(b)(5) provides for carryover of contributions to
so-called "public charities" to the extent that a contribution in any given year exceeds
30% of the individual donor's adjusted gross income. The contribution may be carried
to each of the five succeeding taxable years.
"' S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62
(1964); see also Weltchek, Revenue
Act of 1964: Major Tax Areas Needing Review, 42 Taxes 296, 297 (1964).

"Int.
4
"

Rev. Code of 1954, § 170(b) (2).

Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(a) (3) (1958).
125 50 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1931); see also Nelson Storey III, 38 T.C. 936 (1962),
acq. 1965 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 8 at 6. The Service recently has indicated that it will issue
rulings on such transactions. Rev. Proc. 65-4, 1965 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 8 at 46.
6 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 453 (b). For recent cases involving a similar transaction
between individuals, see Selsor R. Haygood, 42 T.C. 936 (1964); Minnie E. Deal, 29 T.C.
730 (1958).
...Although the seller receives a charitable deduction as each installment is forgiven,
he also may realize income to the extent of the gain on each installment. Rev. Rul. 157,
1955-1 Cum. Bull. 293. But see, Miller v. Usry, 160 F. Supp. 368 (W.D. La. 1958). A
portion of the gain may be taxable as ordinary income under the imputed interest provisions
of § 483. If the transaction is cast in the form of a sale, there may be unrelated business taxable income to the purchasing foundation. See note 117 supra. In addition, a sale may raise
problems under §§ 48, 267, 1239, 1245 and 1250. See notes 11-12, 110 supra. See generally,
Richardson, supra note 102, at 721-22.
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erty," s which will result in the loss of the rental deduction. The
transaction may be arranged, however, to provide for this contingency
by selecting the amount of the annual installments so that if the
payment is not deductible as rent, it still may be deductible as a
charitable contribution.' 9 Another possibility would be to arrange
the transaction so that the donor would annually deed to the foundation an undivided interest in the land equal in value to the desired contribution until the entire property had been transferred.' The donor
would lease the amount of the property so conveyed and although
he would retain title in the remainder of the property, he would have
divested himself of title in the property for which the rental is
payable.
There is, of course, the possibility that the leaseback to the donor,
who effectively controls the employee retirement fund or the private
foundation, will constitute such a retention of dominion and control
over the property as to preclude either a charitable deduction for
contribution of the property or a deduction of the rental payments
under section 162 (a) (3)."' In recent cases involving transfers and
leasebacks with private foundations, however, the Commissioner has
assailed the deductibility of the contributions by attacking the tax
exemption of the foundation under section 503,22 rather than the
deduction of the contributions under section 1 7 0 ."a In the absence
of facts indicating that the transaction is a sham," the Commissioner
has not attacked the rental deductions.
Recent cases in a related area may be useful in evaluating the future
vulnerability of the charitable and rental deductions under a gift and
leaseback with a tax-exempt organization. These cases normally involve a three-party arrangement whereby the shareholders of a
family corporation sell their stock to a charitable foundation, which
12s See notes 97-100 supra.
12' If the amount of the annual installment payments to be forgiven is selected so that
it is less than the maximum charitable deduction to which the individual is entitled, then
the payment may be deductible as a charitable contribution if the rental deduction is disallowed in whole or in part. But cf. J. M. Coulter, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 249, 250 (1950),
which requires proof of donative intent.
0
3 See Rev. Rul. 261, 1958-1 Gum Bull. 143; Rev. Rul. 511, 1957-2 Gum. Bull. 158.
See generally, Cutler, supra note 102, at 1138-40; Rudick & Gray, Bounty Twice Blessed:
Tax Consequences of Gifts of Property to or in Trust for Charity, 16 Tax L. Rev. 273,
279-80 (1961); Young, Tax Effects of Gifts to Charity, 41 Taxes 351, 355-56 (1963).
.. See Louise C. Christenson, 40 T.C. 563 (1963); Burroughs Corp., 33 T.C. 389
(1959); Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1 (e) (1958). See generally, Young, supra note 102, at 991.
32 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 503.
a3aBoman v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1957); Huron Clinic Foundation
v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 847 (D.S.D. 1962), vacated and remanded, 324 F.2d 43
(8th Cir. 1963).
1 See Burroughs Corp., 33 T.C. 389 (1959), discussed in text accompanying notes
94-96 supra.
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liquidates the first corporation and leases the assets to a second corporation in which the original shareholders may or may not have an
interest."' The rental paid by the second corporation (usually a percentage of its profits) to the foundation is used to amortize the debt
to the shareholders of the original corporation.' s Since the dealings
between the parties are designed to represent arm's length transactions, there is normally no element of charitable contribution involved." 7 The transaction is important to our present consideration
for the reason that, in spite of the prearrangement of the transaction
and the obvious tax motivation behind its adoption, the courts in
the past have attributed substance to each step for tax purposes.
Thus, several courts have upheld the capital gain treatment to the
shareholders on the sale of their stock to the foundation and have
allowed a rental deduction to the second corporation upon its lease
of the assets from the foundation; the Supreme Court has recently
upheld the capital-gain aspect of the transaction."'
The tax future of the three-party transaction is not entirely
assured,"' especially with regard to the tax-exempt status of the
vendee-lessor foundation and the deductibility of rent upon the leaseover to the second corporation. The Commissioner presently is attacking the exempt status of a foundation which entered into a sale
and leaseover, and his chances for success appear to be good. 4 ' Although the courts have upheld the exempt status of the foundation in
the gift and leaseback area,' 41 it is not clear what effect a denial of
'3'E.g.,
Warren Brekke, 40 T.C. 789 (1963); Royal Farms Dairy Co., 40 T.C. 173
(1963); Anderson Dairy, Inc., 39 T.C. 1027 (1963); Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 (1961),
aff'd, 325 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1963); Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956), aff'd, 254
F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958); Estate of Goldenberg, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 810 (1964); Ryegate Paper Co., 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 964 (1961). See generally, Weithorn & Noall,
Dealings Between Donors and Foundations, N.Y.U. 6th Conf. on Charitable Foundations
129, 140-45 (1963); Wilson, supra note 105, at 169-81; Young, supra note 102, at 9951002.
"a In a typical arrangement, the leasing corporation agrees to pay as rent 80% of its
annual profits. The foundation agrees, in turn, to apply 90% of the rents received as payments on the purchase price of the assets. E.g., Royal Farms Dairy Co., supra note 135;
Anderson Dairy, Inc., supra note 135; Estate of Goldenberg, supra note 135.
.s The economic inducement for the charity is the annual profit, which is the difference
between the rents received and the purchase price paid, as well as the use of the property
after it is purchased.
...Commissioner v. Brown, 85 S. Ct. 1162 (1965); Brown v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d
313 (9th Cir. 1963); Anderson Dairy Co., 39 T.C. 1027 (1963); Ryegate Paper Co., 20
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 965 (1961).
" For an excellent analysis of future problems and solutions in this area, see Young,
supra note 102, at 1000-02.
"4 The tax-exempt status of the foundation which has engaged in most of the threeparty sale and leaseover transactions presently is pending in the Tax Court. University Hill
Foundation, No. 73993, Tax Ct., June 16, 1958. The Commissioner previously has taken
the position that the involvement of an exempt organization in such a transaction would
result in the loss of its exempt status. Rev. Rul. 420, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 128. See Young,
supra note 102, at 1001 n.176.
"" See cases cited note 133 supra. See also Young, supra note 102, at 996-98.
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the foundation's tax exemption in the sale and leaseover area would
have on the gift-leaseback transaction. The lessee in the sale and leaseover cases usually has been a corporation in which the sellers have
only minority interest, but there is nothing in the opinions which
indicate that this is a necessary requirement for obtaining the desired
tax consequences.' The sale and leaseover arrangement is comparable, therefore, to the sale and leaseback arrangement, which traditionally has been considered in pari materia with the gift-leaseback
arrangement. On the other hand, if a foundation participates in a sale
and leaseback or sale and leaseover transaction, it actively participates
in a business venture as purchaser of business assets, whereas in the
gift-leaseback the foundation risks none of its assets and merely collects rental income." More significantly, the foundation whose tax
exemption presently is being litigated has engaged in a number of sale
and leaseover transactions in past years.'"
Recent cases also have disclosed the vulnerability of the rental
deduction under a sale and leaseover."4' If the original sales price is
excessive and if the original shareholders repurchase the property
shortly after the sale and leaseover, the court will treat the entire
transaction as a sham and will disallow the rent.'" Even where the
sales price is reasonable, the Commissioner, after a series of unsuccessful attempts,'47 has succeeded in disallowing a portion of the rental
deduction.'48 In the most recent decision in this area, the Tax Court
held that if the second corporation fails to show that the rent paid to
the foundation was negotiated apart from the sale of the original corporation, the rental deduction will be disallowed to the extent that
it is excessive.' 49
14, See Wilson, suPra note 105, at 176-78.

" See the discussion at note 117 suPra.
has purchased fifteen to twenty other companies. Young, supra note 102, at 1001 n.167. The code
requires that to be exempt, the foundation must be organized and operated exclusively for
charitable purposes. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501 (c) (3). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.4011(a) (3) (ii) (1956), which requires that a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan be
for the exclusive benefit of the employees.
14' The evolution of the Tax Court's thought, concerning the deductibility of rentals in
the three-party transaction, can be understood best by reading in order the following cases:
Ryegate Paper Co., 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 965 (1961); Anderson Dairy, Inc., 39 T.C.
1027 (1963); Royal Farm Dairy Co., 40 T.C. 173 (1963); Estate of Goldenberg, 23 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 810 (1964).
1"Warren Brekke, 40 T.C. 789 (1963).
"'Anderson Dairy, Inc., 39 T.C. 1027 (1963); Oscar C. Stahl, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
996 (1963); Isis Windows, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 837 (1963).
148 Royal Farms Dairy Co., 40 T.C. 173 (1963); Estate of Goldenberg, 23 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 810 (1964).
149 Estate of Goldenberg, supra note 148, at 826. Although the Royal Farms Dairy and
Goldenberg cases are distinguishable from the normal gift-leaseback arrangement on the
basis that the rent in those cases was excessive, the Tax Court's concern with the separate
negotiation of rent at the time of the leaseover may have important implications in the
gift-leaseback area, where the rental usually is agreed upon prior to the original transfer.
144 One authority indicates that over an eighteen-year period, the foundation
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THE VAN ZANDT DECISION

The Tax Court and Fifth Circuit decisions in the recent case of
Van Zandt v. Commissioner' provide further cause for concern
about the continued deductibility of rent in leasebacks involving related parties. The facts of the case are important to its decision. Dr.
Van Zandt, a Fort Worth surgeon, and his wife established irrevocable short-term trusts for the benefit of their two minor children, with
Dr. Van Zandt as trustee. Real and personal property used in Dr.

Van Zandt's medical practice were transferred by gift to the trust and
immediately leased back to him at a rental which was stipulated to be
reasonable. Although the grantors retained reversionary interests in
the properties conveyed, the trusts were drafted to satisfy the provisions of sections 671-78 of the code, so that the trust income was
not taxable to them. For the two years in question, the Van Zandts
deducted the rent paid to the trusts on their joint income tax return,
and the deduction was disallowed by the Commissioner. The Tax
Court upheld the disallowance on the grounds that the rental payments were not "necessary" within the meaning of section 162 (a),"'
and its decision was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, which held that
In Egbert J. Miles, Jr., 41 T.C. 165 (1963), the rental deduction was disallowed in a
sale and leaseover transaction involving a closely held corporation, a family trust and a
partnership whose members were stockholders of the corporation. The case involved a manufacturing corporation owned by three families which was expanding its operations through
foreign licensing of its patents and trademarks. In order to provide supervision of the foreign operations, to prevent internal conflict, to lessen the corporate tax burden due to the
increased foreign royalty income and to provide economic security for the shareholders'
children, the following transaction was arranged. Bermuda trusts with corporate trustees
were created by the parent shareholders for the benefit of their children, some of whom
were also shareholders in the corporation. The corporation sold the patents and trademarks
to the trust at a price well below their fair market value. The trustees licensed the patents
and trademarks to a partnership, which was controlled primarily by the adult trust beneficiaries, who were stockholders of the corporation. A royalty equal to 90% of the partnership profits was reserved to the trust. The trust was to terminate at the end of ten years,
at which time the corpus was to be distributed to the trust beneficiaries. Tax-wise, the net
effect of the transaction was to shelter income earned by a domestic partnership through
the use of a foreign trust and to provide a tax-free return of the income to the beneficiaries upon termination of the trust.
The Tax Court held that the royalties were not ordinary and necessary business expenses and, therefore, were not deductible by the partnership. The court, relying upon the
Van Zandt and Ingle Coal Corp. cases, held that the trusts were merely conduits in
a prearranged plan to avoid taxes. The court emphasized the nominal consideration received
by the corporation upon the sale of the patents, but failed to discuss the reasonableness of
the royalty payments. In addition, the court failed to discuss the independence of the
trustees, and it distinguished the Brown, Skemp, Felix, and Potter cases on the ground that
they were "arm's length transactions." 41 T.C. at 180. The decision is difficult to rationalize in view of the past history in the family transfer and leaseback area. Although the
transaction may have lacked sufficient business purpose, as evidenced by the nominal purchase price paid by the trust for the patents and by the tax avoidance purpose of the plan,
the Tax Court appears to have based its decision on a much broader rationale-tax avoidance
through reallocation of income within a family group.
150l. L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824 (1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965).
151 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a).
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the entire transaction lacked the business purpose implicitly required
by section 162 (a).
The Tax Court opinion distinguishes prior cases involving intrafamily leasebacks on the grounds of an "independent" trustee in those
cases;... however, the principal rationale of the decision is much
broader. The Tax Court holds that the rental payments, although
"ordinary," are not "necessary" within the meaning of section 162 (a)
because the taxpayer continued to use the leased property in his business in exactly the same manner after the gift-leaseback as he did
before the transaction occurred."'
It is difficult to reconcile the language of the Tax Court decision
with that of the Seventh Circuit in the Skemp case, quoted earlier."4
To the extent that there is an enforceable obligation requiring the payment of rent which is reasonable in amount, the actual rental payments would appear to be necessary."' As the court in Skemp points
out, mere voluntariness in creating a legal obligation does not make
satisfaction of the obligation, once created, unnecessary or not required.
It will be recalled that the Tax Court originally held that the
rentals paid under a family leaseback were not deductible"' and that
this position was changed.. only after two appellate court reversals."'
Although the Tax Court has declined to overrule its later decisions
upholding the deductibility of the rentals,"' the broad rationale of
the Van Zandt case may represent a trend toward its original position.
The Fifth Circuit decision, in its emphasis upon the lack of business purpose of the gift-leaseback arrangement, likewise represents a
departure from past authority. The court relies upon its decision in
the Armston"' case, which involved the sale of corporate property to
a shareholder with a subsequent leaseback to the corporation and in
which it was held that the rentals were not deductible by the corporation in the absence of evidence showing a business purpose for the
entire transaction. As mentioned previously,'' lack of business purpose has been emphasized to deny rental deductions in cases involving sale-leasebacks; however, in prior cases involving gift-lease"'I. L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824, 830 (1963).
"3Id. at 830-31.
15' Quoted in text accompanying note 47 supra.
' See note 82 supra.
'"Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949); A. A. Skemp, 8 T.C. 415 (1947).
". Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950);
Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
"'See John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956); Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954).

See Egbert J. Miles, Jr., 41 T.C. 165 (1963), discussed at note 149 supra.
'.'W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951).
161See note 43 supra.
"'
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backs the courts have either ignored the business purpose argument or
dismissed it as unimportant. No reason appears for distinguishing
between the two methods of transfer.
As factors which preclude the finding of business purpose in Van
Zandt, the Fifth Circuit lists the short term of the trust, the reversion
to the grantors and the predetermination of the right to possession of
the property."2 Interestingly enough, however, the decision does not
mention the absence of an independent trustee. The Skemp case is
distinguished factually with emphasis on the fact that the properties
transferred in Skemp contained considerably more space than was
rented back to the grantor, the implication being that there may
have been business purpose to establish management of the property
other than the property leased back to the grantor."3 The court is
careful to emphasize that the determination of business purpose depends upon a factual evaluation of each case and refuses to condemn
absolutely all transfers between related parties. '
The decision of the Fifth Circuit appears to stand for the proposition that if the only justification for the leaseback transaction is the
reduction of income tax, this by itself is not a sufficient business purpose to sustain the rental deductions under section 162 (a). Any final
analysis of the authoritativeness of the decision for subsequent family
tax planning must take cognizance of the unfavorable fact situation
presented by the taxpayer. Ultimately, the case may be explainable
as an expression of "the usual judicial unfriendliness toward
clever
65
tax schemes that are highly or exclusively tax motivated.'
V.

CONCLUSION

The trend of the decisions in the area of leasebacks involving related parties appears to be toward a restriction of the tax benefits
previously enjoyed through intra-family transfers, transactions involving family foundations and arrangements between closely held
corporations and its employee benefit plans. The law in each of these
areas is in flux at the present time; however, the Internal Revenue
Service has recently, indicated a willingness to provide a measure of
certainty to proposed leaseback transactions by reversing its prior
"no-rulings" policy in this area."'
cRecent cases involving the gift-leaseback transaction provide an
interesting study in the Commissioner's attack upon income shifting
"2Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965).
Id. at 442.

163

.64 Id.
6

at 443.

Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 1961 Supreme
Court Review 135, 157, also in 40 Taxes 296 (1962).
'"Compare Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 30, at 14, 17, with Rev. Proc.
62-32, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 527, 531, and Rev. Proc. 62-30, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 512, 514.
' 'Blum,
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through related-party transfers. Whereas the Government originally
assailed the rental deduction of the donor-lessee under the Clifford
theory of retained dominion and control, recent developments indicate
a shift of emphasis to the statutory provisions of section 162 (a). This
shift is illustrated in the Fifth Circuit's disposition of the taxpayer's
contention in Van Zandt that the question of the deductibility by the
grantor of payments made to the trust should be resolved by a determination of the taxability of the trust income to the grantor. Thus,
it was argued, if the grantor is the "substantial owner" of the trust
under the tests laid down in sections 671-78,"6 then items such as
rent paid by the grantor (which by their nature are income to the
trust) necessarily become trust income includable in the income of
the grantor, with the result that the deduction and the related items
of income cancel each other. 6 In answer to this argument, the court
acknowledged that the trust income is not taxable to the grantor
under sections 671-78, but holds that the question is controlled by
section 162 (a) and that the lack of business purpose results in the
disallowance of the deduction under that section. 6'
Although the court in Van Zandt may be technically correct as to
the applicability of the provisions of sections 671-78 to the deductibility of rentals in a gift-leaseback arrangement,"' the taxpayer's contention has practical merit in that it suggests that the problem of the
deductibility of rent in a leaseback arrangement may be susceptible
to statutory solution. It is believed that with relatively minor adjustments, the provisions of sections 671-78 could be extended to deal
with this problem. In this regard, it is submitted that the rentals
paid under the lease should be deductible by the grantor if, in addition to compliance with the other requirements of the sections, the
rental is reasonable, the grantor retains no reversionary interest in
the property transferred and the trustee is not a related or subordinate party to the grantor.'" Imposition of such requirements would
appear to meet the principal objections of the Commissioner to the
gift-leaseback arrangement and to eliminate the subjective elements
of the business purpose test under section 162 (a).
167Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 671-78.
'"'Brief for Appellant, pp. 10-13, Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th
Cir. 1965).
169341 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir. 1965).
170See text accompanying notes 28-29 subra.
171 In the trust area, generally the use of a related trustee does not defeat the transaction from a tax standpoint, except in those circumstances where the code so provides. However, as pointed out previously, the independence of the trustee has been a prerequisite to
favorable tax treatment in the gift-leaseback transaction. See discussion at text accompanying notes 60-79 supra. If circumstances of this sort are to be used to defeat an otherwise
bona fide leaseback transaction, then it would appear that codification of such rules would
be appropriate in order to provide a reasonable guide to the taxpayer.
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